INTRODUCTION From the monograph: CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE FORMAL THEORY OF BEHAVIOR Published in 1977
Once in a while a new theory appears that marks a major advance in our understanding of the material with which psychiatry and the behavioral sciences deal. Such theories have the capacity of helping us to see familiar matters in a new perspective and to discern aspects of the phenomenological world that were previously hidden from our view by the biases built into the older general theories. As is also true of creative, innovative developments in other fields, such theories are idiosyncratic, heuristic devices that arise out of the author’s life experiences—often at considerable personal expense. The innovator must experience discontent with accepted ways in order to conceive a new view, and he must invest considerable effort in promoting his new ideas which are contrary to well-established theoretical positions. So, we are indebted to the Odyssey of past and present times for the struggles and discomforts they must endure and overcome in order to bring us new perspectives and previously hidden insights. We must also remember, however, that such inventions are heuristic and must be tested against the various realities of our lives and of our world as best we know them. Creativity, by itself, is no guarantee that one’s work will be correct, or of value to one’s colleagues, or helpful to humanity. This is particularly true of creative theories about “man” and what he is like or should be like—many of which have been harmful, as any review of history will indicate. But in balance, we cannot do without creativity and so must find a way of steering between the Scylla of triviality and the Charybdis of creativity’s ever-expanding boundaries. All of this is made more difficult, and yet more comprehensible, when we read the work of Lee Thayer on communication. Since humans both suffer from and glory in being in a perpetual Heraclitean river, the same message repeated is never the same; it has a double function of “forming in”; as well as informing. Thus, as Thayer pointed out, we must settle for “epistemic communities” in our trek with one another. We must invent and agree to &”psycho social structures”, since they do not have a “natural state” as do those systems of lower complexity, such as the physical and biological worlds which are lacking in self-reflexiveness. Thayer’s relativistic concept of “epistemic communities” is similar to Ludwig Von Bertalanffy’s “perspectivistic world view”: there is no absolute truth, only perspectivistic truths. Both Bertalanffy and Thayer agree that some epistemic communities are better than others in terms of their service to the individual and society. Now, where does all of this leave us in terms of The Formal Theory of Behavior? Certainly, Levis’ theory qualifies as an epistemic community, but it goes further in that it adds a new Bertalanffian perspectivistic slice through which to view the biopsychosocial world. Thus the Formal Theory represents a new Thayerian epistemic community, yet one with roots in older theories. It consists of a combination of continuity and discontinuity with older epistemic communities, and this is as it should be. As Harley Shands points out, neither “total newness” nor “total knowness” has any real value or meaning, or any real qualification as an epistemic community. What is this new perspectivistic slice, this new epistemic community of Albert Levis and The Formal Theory of Behavior? What is this new lever this modern Archimedes offers us to lift the world to newer heights? It is nothing less than a new way of ordering and conceptualizing human behavior that bridges the here-and-now with man’s long behavioral history, and it does so with both the possibility of predictive accuracy and the opportunity for variability and change. It also bridges the conceptual gaps which have existed between cognitive and emotive schools of thought, between psychoanalysis and learning theory, between the work of Jean Piaget and that of the neo-Freudians-- and, finally, between the worlds of psychology and sociology. The Formal Theory achieves this by reconciling the methodology of the “hard sciences”, such as logic and mathematics with that of the “soft sciences”, the disciplines of human behavior. This is quite a claim for a new theory. If I am to make such a claim, it is time to identify myself as a member of those epistemic communities relevant to being a “value theorist” for members of the psychiatric, sociological, and anthropological communities to whom Levis is addressing his book. First, I am a psychiatrist with 32 years of experience, with board certification for 26 years, and with the status of Fellow of the American Psychiatric Association for 11 years. I am a theoretician as well as a clinician, and, as such, have been credited as the prime mover in introducing General Systems Theory to the psychiatric profession, as well as for having developed the humanistic school of general systems thought. From this I have evolved my own theories of Emotional Cognitive Structuralism and a new, generic form for the use of General Systems Theory in which the focus is not exclusively upon “system effects” but rather upon the previously neglected areas of “system precursors” and “system forming”. As a result of these developments I have become moderately well known, with the result that from time to time young innovators, particularly those attracted to General Systems Theory, look me up for discussion and consultation concerning their ideas. It is in this way that I met Albert Levis. Through our conversations and the early form of his book on the Formal Theory of Behavior, I came to know and appreciate his theory; thus I have added the Levis theory to the list of epistemic communities to which I belong. To proceed with an insider’s view of the Formal Theory, Levis has obviously drawn from his personal membership in both the Greek and Jewish cultures and has added to this the experiences of medical school in Switzerland and of becoming an American. During the last ten years he has accomplished the amazing task of integrating and organizing his knowledge, experiences, and intuitive insights into The Formal Theory of Behavior. What then has been accomplished? First of all, the Formal Theory brings significant unity out of previously diverse and disconnected views. It brings into unity Time-Distant and Time-Present. Suddenly one can see the isomorphism in the long- range cultural trends over centuries, the mid-range time span of one generation, and the here-and-now behavior being displayed in clinical workshops or treatment sessions. The Formal Theory, while indicating the inevitability of repetition of the basic patterns of our culture, at the same time provides the possibility of change through recognition of these patterns and alternatives to them. The second unity-through-diversity that Levis’ theory achieves is in bringing a living connectedness between the previously disparate areas of psychotherapy, behavioral theory, and the mathematical theory of groups. Through what must be considered a creative achievement of the first rank, Levis has succeeded in describing human behavior in terms of the concept of roles as formal relations. Role relations befit both the essence of behavior and the essence of mathematics. Formal relations have the properties of symmetry, transitivity, and correlation; they may be graphically portrayed and quantified. The properties of relations permit us to connect roles in time and within a system, and present them graphically in terms of normative variations of their active and passive forms. Relations obey the fundamental properties of mathematical groups. Thus, Levis integrates behavior and mathematical group theory, with its laws of closure, associativity, identity, and inverse-- and, in particular, the Kleinian form of mathematical group theory, which was of special interest and usefulness to Jean Piaget. The Kleinian group of four transformations—identity, negation, reciprocity, and correlation — serves now in formalizing the dynamics of the behavioral process. What is remarkable is that those Kleinian operations apply to both the individual and his society, the intra-psychic and the interpersonal. The way that Levis’ role relations fit into the Kleinian group can be understood by studying for a moment a role assumption of one individual (#1) versus a role assumption of another individual (#2). If individual #2 behaves in ways which are equivalent or imitative of those of individual #1, then the relational form is that of identity. If individual #2 behaves in ways which are antithetical to or cancel out those affected by individual #1’s role assumption, then the relational form is negation. Behaviors of individual #2 which neutralize transformations effected by the role assumption of individual #1 are illustrative of the relational form of reciprocity, while if individual #2 behaves in a neutral, non-conflictual manner correlated to the ways of individual #1, then the relational form is that of correlation. By applying role relations to the laws of groups, Levis establishes formal correlations between role relational states. He correlates reciprocal roles, states of passivity and activity, into role bipoles. These are of great significance because a chain of correlated activity and passivity states is shown to characterize the lifetime process. He shows that a lifetime is composed of three such passivity-activity cycles. The first cycle is role oppression-role assumption, the second cycle is anticipated role reversal—counterphobic role assumption, and the third cycle is role reversal- compromise role assumption. Here you have Levis’ second great accomplishment: use of the concept of I “role” in a magical way which permits an individual’s life to be viewed as a system of interrelated roles and to see this passing from one generation to the next. Thus, roles have transgenerational implications. And in this transgenerational area there is a phase alternation between curves and a three-phase distance between successive curves; that is, the next generation’s phase one, role oppression, coincides with phase four, counterphobic role assumption, of the preceding generational curve. In conclusion, Levis uses the concept of role to bring behavior into congruence with mathematical group theory. The third important accomplishment by Levis in the Formal Theory of Behavior is the reinclusion into psychiatric theory of the concept of “energy”. In Freud’s time, psychic energy and cathexis were universally accepted as a necessary part of the psychic system. More recent times, however, have seen “energy” being downgraded in favor of “patterning” as the really important concept and “psychic energy” being considered a reification of some imaginary concept. But this defies common sense and everyday observation, and it has taken the genius and courage of Levis to bring psychic and social energy into a state of respectability and essentialness. Actually, the bringing of behavioral science into accord with the mathematical theory of groups would not be possible without the assumption of the existence of totalities, totalities whose nature is energetic. The postulation of energetic totalities implies conservation of energy; otherwise, over time, entropic effects would erode the energy of the group. Levis’ theory, then, is built on the law of conservation of energy within ideally-closed systems. Thus the theory advances three assumptions: (1) that psychosocial continua exist; (2) that energy is the subject matter of these continua; and (3) that conditions of quasi closure exist in these continua, permitting conservation of energy within them. The Formal Theory views interactional and intrapsychic systems as quasi-closed, steady-state systems, otherwise the law of conservation could not hold. The traits of quasi closure in the psychosocial system are contingent upon an intense emotional involvement of the individual in a long-lasting and exclusive relationship. I believe that this concept of energetic quasi closure is an extremely important step forward in the elaboration of a pure theory. There are many who are so fascinated by Bertalanffy’s concept of open systems that they will impulsively dismiss what Levis has to say. For myself, I have always been in opposition to those who equate open systems with goodness and closed systems with badness. A totally open system such as Shand’s “total newness” has no meaning, and a totally closed system such as Shand’s “total knowness” is equally meaningless. So let us accept Levis’ concept of conditional closure, or quasi closure. I believe that, for the most of us, our clinical experience shows that there is conservation of energy in the psycho social continuum and that, under the special conditions of strongly interdependent relationships, such continua may be viewed as relational systems which have the characteristics of mathematical groups. The fourth contribution stems from Levis’ application of the Formal Theory to the cross-cultural study of alternative role structures, as portrayed by his analysis of three primordial forms of father-son relationships. He shows the systemic interdependence of role positions in terms of correlated behaviors and feelings which set in motion three different dynamics. Because of the quasi-closed systemic nature of the interactional process, these primordial patterns are transmitted and maintained from generation to generation over the centuries. Whether we call the three archetypical forms Judaic, Oriental, and Greek, or use the neutral terms of equalitarian, subordinancy, and dominance, we are dealing with a remarkable achievement which demonstrates the self-perpetuating and differentiating dynamics that, once set in motion, obey the laws of conservation of energy. The Formal Theory, which permits us to conceive of self- sustaining dynamics in quasi-closed systems, also provides a mechanism for their restructuring and change by transforming them into open systems and then modifying their energetic states. Let us now turn to the fifth contribution that the Formal Theory can make to psychiatric and behavioral science. It offers, for the first time, a rational and non- degrading method for the definition of mental health and illness along a continuum circumscribed by a sociological and psychological dimension. This method equates diagnosis with definition of the transferential disposition and, simultaneously, indicates desirable therapeutic changes and treatment goals. For me, the value of this newly formed classification system starts with the term passive-aggressive, a term poorly understood by me and, I am sure, by many of my colleagues. Levis’ answer is simplicity itself and stems from his fundamental and crucial replacement of propositional logic by relational logic. With this, the Gordian knot is cut: our complicated propositional definitions resolve to four clearly definable relational forms. These forms deal with the individual’s characteristic reaction to stress, and each corresponds to a clinical syndrome: submissive-cooperative (passive-dependent), submissive-antagonistic (passive-aggressive), dominant-cooperative (active-dependent), and dominant- antagonistic (active-aggressive). By adding dimensions of dominance, normalcy, and subordinacy to social system tensions and by adding dimensions of personality, neurosis, and psychosis to the area of psychic tension, a complete diagnostic spectrum is formed. In therapy, this system gives clear leads to the transference structuring, the necessary contractual restructuring, and resolution of the patient-therapist relationship. Levis has built a psychotherapeutic system from the basic assumptions just outlined. This system can portray the relationship between the intrapsychic and the interpersonal; it therefore has a psychosocial format. Of remarkable interest is the geometry of psychosocial forms that Levis’ has evolved. His system of diagramming, with its ellipses and circles, is unique in its clarity and its capacity to portray the vector quality of the forces; i.e., whether they are antagonistic (as indicated by counterclockwise arrows) or cooperative (as indicated by clockwise arrows). His diagramming also portrays intensities by the addition of scalar elements; i.e., concentric rings or ellipses of varying size to indicate quantities. The Formal Theory is able to assess any particular clinical situation in terms of social and psychic variables and also to portray these observations graphically and quantitatively. Now I have completed the very pleasant task of writing an introduction for a promising theory that I predict will bring much clarity and growth to our presently rather muddled formulations. Not only will it accommodate other theoretical forms, it will also bring them to a new degree of elegance and productivity that is the essence of Levis; Formal Theory of Behavior. The book itself is, of course, more elegant and interesting than the introduction, and this is as it should be: an introduction is a recommendation, a trust of pleasures to come, and not the real meal that will follow. I am indebted to Albert Levis for inviting me to write this introduction, as those who read this most charming and fruitful work will feel indebted to him for the labor and genius that he has put into its creation.